SEISMIC PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

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ABSTRACT:
Seismic assessments of a sample conventional and base-isolated nuclear power plant (NPP) are performed using a new procedure that builds on the methodology presented in the draft ATC-58 Guidelines and the widely used Zion method, which uses fragility curves defined in terms of ground-motion parameters. The new procedure improves the Zion method by using fragility curves that are defined in terms of structural response parameters since damage and failure of NPP components are more closely tied to structural response parameters than to ground motion parameters. The proposed performance assessment procedure is used to evaluate the mean annual probability of unacceptable performance of the sample NPP reactor buildings. The seismic performance assessment confirms the utility of seismic isolation at reducing seismic risk in NPPs.

KEYWORDS: Nuclear power plant, seismic performance assessment, loss computation, base isolation, secondary systems, scaling of ground motions

1. INTRODUCTION
Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) was developed in the early 1980s and subsequently accepted by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) to be used in nuclear power plant (NPP) Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). The most widely used SPRA procedure is the Zion method, which was first developed and applied in the Oyster Creek probabilistic risk assessment and later improved and applied in 1981 to estimate seismic risk for the Zion Plant (Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick et al. 1981). The SPRA procedure uses component fragility curves to characterize the probability of failure for NPP structural and nonstructural components as a function of a demand parameter. In the Zion method, the component fragility curves are defined in terms of ground-motion parameters (generally peak ground acceleration), although the failure of a component has a much improved correlation to structural response parameters, such as floor spectral acceleration and story drift.

Procedures for seismic performance assessment of buildings have been developed in the ATC-58 project and proposed in the 35% draft Guidelines for Seismic Performance Assessment of Buildings (ATC 2007) (termed the draft ATC-58 Guidelines hereafter). These procedures use fragility curves that are defined using structural response parameters. The procedures in the draft ATC-58 Guidelines cannot be used directly for performance assessment of NPPs because the methodology does not accommodate accident sequences, event trees and fault trees but provides the robust technical basis needed to develop an alternative procedure for seismic probabilistic risk assessment for NPPs.

This paper summarizes a new procedure (Huang et al. 2008, 2009a) based on the Zion method and the methodology presented in the draft ATC-58 Guidelines for seismic performance assessment of NPPs. The proposed procedure improves the Zion method by using nonlinear response-history analysis and structural response-based fragility curves. This paper introduces the new procedure by presenting a seismic performance assessment of a sample NPP reactor building of conventional and base-isolated construction. The impact of the implementation of base isolation on the seismic performance of the sample NPP (Huang et al. 2008, 2009b) is identified.
2. SAMPLE NPP REACTOR BUILDINGS

Figure 1 shows a cutaway view of a NPP reactor building of conventional construction. This hypothetical NPP is sited in the Eastern United States. A lumped-mass stick model of this reactor building was developed in the computer code SAP2000 Nonlinear (CSI 2002) for the purpose of response-history analysis. The model, shown in Figure 2a, is composed of two sticks: one representing the containment structure and the other representing the internal structure. The two sticks are structurally independent and are connected only at the base. The mechanical properties of the frame elements that compose each stick were back-calculated from a 3D model of the reactor building. Bilinear shear hinges with 3% post-yield stiffness were assigned to all frame elements in the internal-structure stick only since the containment vessel was designed for large internal pressures resulting from a postulated accident and load combinations including seismic effects generally did not control its design. The total height of the containment structure is 59.5 meters and its first mode period is approximately 0.2 second. The thickness of the post-tensioned concrete cylindrical wall of the containment structure is about 1 meter. The height of the internal structure is 39 meters. The first mode period of the internal structure in both horizontal directions is approximately 0.14 second. The total weight \( W \) of the NPP reactor building is approximately 75,000 tons.

Figure 1. Cutaway view of the sample NPP reactor building

Figure 2. Stick model for the sample NPP reactor building
Three numerical models of base-isolated reactor buildings were also developed in SAP2000 Nonlinear to study the impact of seismic isolation on demands on secondary systems in the sample NPP reactor building. The three base-isolated models include representations of Friction Pendulum™ (FP) bearings, lead-rubber (LR) bearings and low damping rubber (LDR) bearings, respectively. Only the results for the conventional NPP and the base-isolated NPP using LR bearings are presented in this paper. The LR bearings were modeled using bilinear plasticity elements. Figure 3 shows the key variables defining the bilinear hysteresis loop. The period associated with the second-slope stiffness was assigned a value of 2 seconds.

The seismic performance assessments performed in this study focus on the secondary systems in the sample NPP reactor building since the costs associated with analysis, design, construction, testing and regulatory approval of secondary systems can dominate the cost of NPPs (Huang et al. 2008). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of several important secondary systems in the sample reactor building, such as the reactor, steam generator and emergency coolant injection (ECI) tank. These secondary systems are attached to the internal structure and supported at elevations of 7 (Node 201), 18 (Nodes 1006 and 1009) and 39 m (Nodes 215 and 216). Figure 2b identifies the node numbers assigned to the internal structure of the sample NPP. In this study, the floor response spectral demands at these three elevations are computed using response-history analysis for seismic performance assessments.

3. SEISMIC PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

3.1. Overview of the Proposed Procedure

The proposed procedure includes five steps, as presented in Figure 4. Step 1 involves the characterization of the seismic hazard. The procedure allows the seismic hazard to be defined using a user-specified intensity of earthquake shaking, a user-specified scenario of earthquake magnitude and distance or a time-based representation considering all possible earthquakes. The final products of intensity- and scenario-based assessments are the probability of unacceptable performance of the NPP to the specified intensity and scenario of earthquake shaking, respectively. The final product of a time-based assessment is the annual frequency of unacceptable performance of the NPP. In this paper, only the results for the time-based assessment of the sample NPP are presented since the annual frequency of unacceptable performance is the most widely used index for risk assessment of NPPs.

Step 2 of the proposed procedure requires the user to develop fragility curves for the structural and nonstructural components of the NPP, as well as the possible accident sequences for unacceptable performance, such as core melt and radiation release. Step 3 involves response-history analysis of the NPP subjected to the seismic hazard of Step 1 to estimate the accelerations, forces, displacements and deformations that serve as demands on the NPP’s components and contents. Damage of the structural and nonstructural components is assessed in Step 4 using the demands computed in Step 3 and fragility curves developed in Step 2. Step 5 involves the computation of seismic risk using the results of Step 4 and the accident sequences developed in Step 2. The rest of Section 0 presents each step of the time-based assessment of the sample NPP. Only the procedures and results of the assessment are reported herein.
3.2. **Step 1: Characterize Earthquake Shaking**

A time-based assessment is performed as a series of intensity-based assessments. Each intensity-based assessment is associated with a target spectral intensity \( e_i \) at the fundamental period of the NPP and an annual frequency \( \lambda_i \cdot \Delta \) for the target spectral intensity. Both \( e_i \) and \( \lambda_i \cdot \Delta \) are determined from a seismic hazard curve. Figure 5a presents the 0.14-second mean seismic hazard curve for the sample NPP site used in the time-based assessment of the conventional sample NPP. The range of spectral acceleration between 0.05 and 2.68 g was split into 8 equal intervals. The range of spectral acceleration was selected to capture all significant risk to the sample NPP. The parameter \( e_i \) for each intensity-based assessment was determined by the midpoint spectral acceleration in each interval; \( \lambda_i \cdot \Delta \) was determined by the interval of annual frequency of earthquake intensity in the range of \( \Delta e_i \). The values of \( e_i \) and \( \lambda_i \cdot \Delta \) are presented in Figure 5a and the second column of Table 1, respectively.

![Figure 5](image-url)

**Figure 5.** Scaling ground motions for the time-based assessment of the conventional sample NPP

- a. Computation of target spectral ordinates
- b. Response spectra of the ground motions in Bins TC1 and TC8
Table 1. Computation of annual frequency of unacceptable performance of the conventional and base-isolated NPPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conventional NPP</th>
<th>Base-isolated NPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G.M. bin</td>
<td>$\Delta \lambda_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC1</td>
<td>1.35E-03</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC2</td>
<td>5.18E-05</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC3</td>
<td>1.24E-05</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC4</td>
<td>4.63E-06</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC5</td>
<td>2.23E-06</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC6</td>
<td>1.08E-06</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC7</td>
<td>6.90E-07</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC8</td>
<td>4.59E-07</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\sum_{i=1}^{8} \Delta \lambda_i \times P_i$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another task of step 1 is to select and scale ground motions used in response-history analysis for each intensity assessment. Due to the lack of earthquake histories from large magnitude events in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS), the computer code “Strong Ground Motion Simulation (SGMS)” (Halldorsson 2004) was used to generate CEUS-type ground motions appropriate for the sample NPP site. Eleven SGMS-generated ground motions were amplitude scaled to each $\epsilon_i$ identified in Figure 5a at a period of 0.14 second. The resultant eight bins of ground motions were denoted Bins TC1 through TC8. The response spectra of the ground motions in Bins TC1 and TC8 are presented in Figure 5b. The analysis presented in this subsection was repeated for the base-isolated NPP using a 2-second hazard curve for the sample NPP site. The resultant eight bins of ground motions were denoted Bins T11 through T18. More information for the hazard curves used and ground motions developed in Step 1 can be found in Huang et al. (2008, 2009b).

3.3. Step 2: Perform System Analysis of the Plant and Develop Component Fragility Curves

The purpose of system analysis of a NPP is to determine possible accident sequences leading to the unacceptable performance. A robust way for this task is to use event trees and fault trees (see Reed and Kennedy 1994 for more information). The unacceptable performance of the sample NPP evaluated in this study was defined as the failure of any of the secondary systems at Nodes 201, 1009 and 216. This unacceptable performance can be defined by the fault tree of Figure 6 where the “OR” gate defines the occurrence of the event right above the gate (the unacceptable performance) as the occurrence of one or more failure events immediately below the gate (the failure of secondary systems).

![Fault Tree](image)

Figure 6. A fault tree for the unacceptable performance of the sample NPP
Fragility data are required in the proposed performance-assessment procedure for all basic failure events at the lowest level of the fault tree. In this study, the demand parameter used to develop fragility curves for the secondary systems in the sample NPP is Average Floor Spectral Acceleration over 5 through 33 Hz, termed AFSA herein, since the seismic demands on secondary systems in NPPs are characterized typically using a floor response spectrum and the frequencies of most secondary systems are in the range of 5 through 33 Hz. (For a project specific application, any demand parameter could be used but fragility curves would have to constructed for that parameter.) Figure 7 presents the three fragility curves used in this study. The median AFSA values are 2.26, 3.15 and 7.02 g for the curves for Nodes 201, 1009 and 216, respectively, and the logarithmic standard deviation for the three curves is 0.43. More information for the development of the fragility curves of Figure 7 can be found in Huang et al. (2008, 2009a, 2009b).

![Figure 7. Mean fragility curves for the secondary systems at Nodes 201, 1009 and 216](image)

### 3.4. Step 3: Simulate Structural Response

Unidirectional nonlinear response-history analyses were performed for the conventional NPP subjected to the Bins TC1 through TC8 ground motions and for the base-isolated NPP subjected to the Bins TI1 through TI8 ground motions in the X and Y directions. Sample results for the conventional NPP subjected to the Bin TC8 ground motions and the base-isolated NPP subjected to the Bin TI8 ground motions are presented in Figure 8 using black dots. The X and Y axes of Figure 8 are the values of AFSA at Nodes 201 and 216, respectively. The demands on the secondary systems in the base-isolated NPP are significantly smaller than those in the conventional NPP.

![Figure 8. AFSA at Nodes 201 and 216 for 1) the conventional NPP to the Bin TC8 ground motions and 2) the isolated NPP to the Bin TI8 ground motions in the X direction](image)
Table 2 presents a demand-parameter matrix using the results of response-history analysis for the conventional NPP subjected to the Bin TC8 ground motions. In the proposed procedure, all demand parameters used in the fragility curves developed in Step 3 are required to be included in the demand-parameter matrix. In the case of Table 2, each row vector of the matrix includes six values for the AFSA values at Nodes 201, 1009 and 216 in the X and Y directions from the analysis using a ground motion in Bin TC8. The number of row vectors in the demand-parameter matrix, which is 11 in this case, is determined by the number of ground motions in a bin. For each NPP model and ground-motion bin, a demand-parameter matrix, similar to that of Table 2, was generated and used in the performance assessment.

Table 2. Demand-parameter matrix for the conventional NPP subjected to the Bin TC8 ground motions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GM No.</th>
<th>AFSA in the X direction (g)</th>
<th>AFSA in the Y direction (g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Node 201</td>
<td>Node 1009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>6.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>5.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>6.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>6.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>6.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>5.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5. Step 4: Assess Damage of NPP Components

A Monte Carlo type procedure was used to assess the failure events at the lowest level of the fault tree of Figure 6, i.e., the failure of secondary systems at Nodes 201, 1009 and 216. For example, the value of AFSA at Node 201 in the X direction for the conventional NPP subjected to GM1 in Bin TC8 is 5.36 g, as shown in the demand-parameter matrix of Table 2. Per the fragility curve of Figure 7 for Node 201, the probability of failure is 0.98 at an AFSA of 5.36 g. A random number generator that generates random numbers uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 was used to select the damage state for the secondary system at Node 201. If the realization generated by the random generator is smaller or equal to 0.98, the secondary system is considered to have failed; and if the realization is greater than 0.98, the secondary system is considered to have passed. This procedure was repeated for all other five AFSA values in the row vector for GM1 to determine the success or failure of each basic event at the lowest level of the fault tree of Figure 6. According to the accident sequence defined in the fault tree, if any of the basic failure events occurs, the unacceptable performance is considered occurred for the sample NPP subjected to GM1. This analysis was repeated for all other row vectors in the demand-parameter matrix.

3.6. Step 5: Compute the Risk

The use of Monte Carlo procedures requires a large set of simulations so that the probability and annual frequency of the unacceptable performance can be estimated with high confidence. The large set of simulations can be generated by two procedures, 1) directly by a large number of response-history analyses, or 2) indirectly by statistical manipulation of the results of a smaller number of analyses. The draft ATC-58 Guidelines presents one acceptable procedure, which was also used in this study, for generating a large number of simulations through statistical manipulation of a relatively small number of structural analyses (ATC 2007; Yang et al. 2006). The Yang et al. procedure can be used to increase the number of row vectors in a demand-parameter matrix.
without performing response-history analysis. Figure 8 presents the distribution of AFSA obtained using response-history analysis (11 row vectors) and that generated per the Yang et al. procedure (200 row vectors). The results show that the AFSA values generated per the Yang et al. procedure preserve the magnitude and correlation in AFSA obtained using response-history analysis.

The Yang et al. procedure was used to increase the number of row vectors in the demand-parameter matrix for each of the 8 intensity-based assessments from 11 to 2000 and 200,000 for the conventional and isolated sample NPPs, respectively. Step 4 was repeated for each new demand-parameter matrix and the probability of unacceptable performance ($P_i$) associated with the new demand-parameter matrix was computed as the ratio of the number of row vectors with unacceptable performance to the total number of row vectors in the matrix. The values of $P_i$ are presented in the third and seventh columns of Table 1 for the conventional and isolated sample NPPs. The mean annual frequency of unacceptable performance for each model was computed by summing the eight products of $P_i$ and $\Delta \lambda$. Per Table 1, the mean annual frequency of unacceptable performance of the base-isolated NPP (4.25E-11) is nearly six orders of magnitude smaller than that of the conventional NPP (2.55E-05).

4. CLOSING REMARKS

A new procedure that builds on the methodology presented in the draft ATC-58 Guidelines and the Zion method is summarized for the seismic performance assessment of safety-related nuclear structures. The procedure uses fragility curves defined using structural response parameters rather than ground motion parameters.

The seismic performance of a sample conventional and base-isolated NPP reactor building was evaluated using the new procedure. The mean annual frequencies of unacceptable performance of the conventional and base-isolated sample NPPs are 2.55E-05 and 4.25E-11, respectively.

REFERENCES


