

We have observed a radical shift in philosophy during Renaissance. Renaissance scholars completely banished society and natural social institutions (the subject matter of traditional theories) from political philosophy and furnished it with new presuppositions namely hypothetical man and constructed society. In this century doubts have been raised in some philosophical circles regarding the relevance of political philosophy. They do not seem to take this change into account. To adjudicate the relevance of political philosophy without taking this change into consideration is not valid.

Keeping this phenomenon as the subject of inquiry for the present dissertation and in order to bring out this change clearly, attempts have been made to state the pre-suppositions of modern political thought namely man and society. Social contract theories and Liberal utilitarianism were selected as representatives of modern thought. Here modern refers to the historical state namely seventeenth century, the later theories have to be understood either as deviations from or extension of this basic framework. To substantiate issues have been attacked by some on theoretical levels and by others on practical levels with which we are in agreement. The implications following this acceptance is pernicious to the existence of political philosophy. Rees who implicitly assumes that the problem of political obligation is the problem of political philosophy fears that acceptance of this problem as senseless makes political philosophy without proper subject matter. However, we do not agree with this as we have shown that the false assumptions of man and society (of Renaissance) have been the subject matter of political philosophy by rejecting the natural social institutions and the concept of man in society. By exposing these modern assumptions without making political philosophy barren, it can be furnished with complex social institutions and man's relations with them. To accomplish this task the present dissertation runs as follows:

Part 1 consists of chapter I and II. These two chapters discuss the presuppositions of modern political philosophy, namely pre-societal man and society as human artifact.

Part 2 consists of chapter III and IV, in which some of the problems arising from the presuppositions have been discussed.

The chapter wise account is as follows:

Section 1, of the first chapter attempts to state the presuppositions of social contract theories. The obvious differences stated in the literature amongst the three contract philosophers Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke pertain to the attributes of man in the state of nature and reasons for his transition to a civil society through a contract. The common features underlying these differences are the varying conceptions of man in the state of nature and the transition from this state of civil society through a contract. These common features have been explicated. However the differences and common features are not arbitrary but follow a pattern. The differences are regarding whether man in the state of nature is brutish or a noble savage or good and rational and the reasons for the transition.

Section 2 of chapter I attempts to state the concept of man in liberal utilitarianism. There are certain significant differences between Bentham and J. S. Mill. For the former, utility is quantitative for the latter it is qualitative. And the measure of utility is acts for Bentham and social rules for Mill. Despite these differences, utility and individualism are common to both. Mill tried to avoid the difficulties of contract philosophers by taking man in society and introducing the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions. This however did not succeed. After Mill's failure in explaining the relation between these kinds of actions, it has been shown how Mill, inspired by important differences with contract philosophers, failed

to come out of their influence. His self-regarding actions and psychologism involved in it : shown to have resembled the contract philosophers idea of man in the sate of nature.

The first section of chapter II attempts to state the concept of society in contr philosophies. Different social alternatives proposed by Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke h been examined. Hobbesian common wealth is a social existence set up by people transforming their power to it to ensure their existence. It is monarchical in its nature a ultimate in its judgments. Rousseau's sovereign is constituted for people who enter into c society which is governed by General will, by giving up their particular will. Lockean society constitutional and is governed by majority. But behind these differences there is someth common to the three contract philosophers namely society for them is rooted in the p societal man. That is society as made by man, thus making society structurally dependent man.

The second section of the same chapter goes on to state the concept of society with liberal utilitarianism. We have first shown the directional difference between Bentham and contract philosophers. That is both Bentham and the contract philosophers treat society artificial. Contract philosophers start with man but by dissolving man common collectiv become collectivities. Bentham by resolving community which is a fictitious body into its ba constituent parts i.e. individuals becomes an individualist. Further we have stated differences between Bentham and J.S. Mill concerning the quantitative and qualitative for of utility, act and rule- utilitarianism. However both Bentham and Mill are individualists whom society makes sense only with reference to man, thus making society functiona dependent on man.

In section 1, chapter III the problem of political obligation is discussed. It has be shown that this problem is a modern one exclusively emerging from the presuppositions man stated in chapter i. C.B. McPherson's theory of possessive individualism is discuss Possessive individualism is a theory which identifies man with his possessions non-socie man whose hypothetical existence was posited by seventeenth century thinkers independent of society. Accepting possessive individualism as one form of mod individualism stated in chapter I and by showing the difficulties in C.B. McPherso conclusions we have moved to the discussion of Margaret MacDonald and Thon McPherson. To both them the problem of political obligation is a senseless one; though th discussion lack clarity of the presuppositions of the seventeenth century, yet their attempt show that this is a modern problem is accepted after considerable modification.

In section 2, chapter III yet another contemporary issue namely mass phenomena shown to have its roots in the concept of man stated in chapter I. Oakeshott and Eric From have been discussed to reveal that the roots masses lie in the modern assumption of m Oakeshott analyses different stages from hypothetical individualism to loneliness of man a anti-individual attitude as a reaction to the state of loneliness. Fromm analyses the sta from Renaissance freedom from to the state of loneliness and man's escapist mechanis from this state namely Fascist psychological traits such as masochism sadism which pa way to masses and totalitarianism.

These two separate issues discussed in chapter III are shown to have arisen from broad perspective stated in chapter I.

In section 1, chapter IV by introducing Talmon's distinction between two forms of clos societies dictatorship and totalitarianism it has been shown that popper is wrong in treat plato as a totalitarian. Totalitarianism is a recent phenomena rooted in contract philosoph

notion of society i.e., society as a human construction and abolition of natural social institutions as stated in section 1, chapter II. This failure of Popper is attributed to his failure to see the radical shift taken place in the seventeenth century. One of the modern forms of contract philosophers' notion of society namely collective economic planning has been included. Sidney Hook's attempt to dissociate collective economic planning from totalitarianism, Hayek's criticism of the feasibility of collective economic planning and Michal Polanyi's criticism of the very assumptions of collective economic planning have been discussed.

Section 2, chapter IV discusses the problems that the liberal's concept of society (as stated in section 2, chapter IV) has generated. Glenn Negley's discussions as to how the individualist school such as those of Bentham and Kant failed to posit an objective social order necessary for functioning of social existence is elaborated. Both Bentham and Kant realized this difficulty in their later writings but they could not come out of this difficulty due to their individualist assumptions. Negley on the other hand argues as men were not given the treatment they deserved in liberal theory. The two issues discussed above (in section 1 and section 2 of chapter IV) are shown to have their roots in the presuppositions of society stated earlier in section 1 and section 2 of chapter II respectively.

The four issues discussed in chapter III and IV were shown to have originated from the modern assumptions of man and society stated in chapter I and II. Though the assumptions and the problems discussed in these chapters constitute the subject matter of modern political philosophy nevertheless acceptance of the critique presented in this work does not make political philosophy vacuous and irrelevant as feared by Rees. We disagree with Rees who seems to treat the problem of political obligation as the problem of political philosophy. We also disagree with him that acceptance of political obligation as a senseless problem is pernicious to the existence of political philosophy. Here it has been maintained that from an undesirable state of affairs no general conclusions can be drawn regarding the relevance of political philosophy. We suggested that the natural social institutions (such as family, customary law, Church, local authorities, market etc.) and man in his various institutional set-ups which were rejected by Renaissance thinkers to accommodate the false assumptions of man and society can be brought back into political philosophy.

Further we have discussed some of the implications of contract philosophers' attitudes towards society. They are towards culture which is necessary for any becoming social existence (T.S. Eliot), language and law (Hayek). Offering an alternative perspective using the available vocabulary may not bring desired results. So we have suggested that thinkers such as Aristotle, Tocqueville, C.G. Jung etc. (who happened to be pluralists) are to be studied independently to acquire proper vocabulary with the help of which more meaningful and adequate discussion and analyses of the significant social institutions may be performed.